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Ethanol Policy in the Clean Air · Free Trade Era 
Abstract 
The U.S. corn ethanol industry is a subsidized, high cost, trade 
protected, limited scale industry; unable to compete in free 
markets or to efficiently supply new fuel demands of clean air 
legislation. Lower cost, sugar cane ethanol from Latin America 
(Brazil) should be a supplementary source, especially for U.S. 
coastal markets. Counter trade - corn for ethanol - would be 
more beneficial to U.S. corn producers than domestic ethanol 
corn markets. Variable producer subsidies should replace 
current market subsidy and import tax policies; giving limited 
protection to the domestic ethanol industry, while assuring 
adequate low cost ethanol supplies through competitive imports. 
Free trade arrangements are proliferating in the Western Hemisphere 
and clean air legislation is changing the profile of automotive fuels, especially 
in the United States. These changes present unprecedented opportunities for 
agriculture (ethanol) to participate as a major supplier of environmentally 
positive automotive fuels. The U.S. ethanol industry, however, is ill prepared 
to take advantage of this opportunity, and protectionist polices block wider 
participation from lower cost ethanol producers throughout the Hemisphere. 
There are many economic and policy problems affecting the market 
potential of the U.S. corn ethanol industry. After ten years of growth, it 
continues as a high cost, highly subsidized, trade protected, regionally located, 
and producer oriented program without a market focus. In the 1980s, the 
need to replace lead as an octane additive in gasoline gave ethanol its first 
significant market opportunity. But, petroleum refiners opted in large 
measure to substitute other octane sources (principally MTBE) for lead rather 
than rely on small, subsidized, and uncertain long run supplies of ethanol. 
A number of additional market shortcomings contributed to low 
acceptance of ethanol as an octane enhancer. These included: transport and 
storage difficulties; variable state subsidy levels; a single fixed gasoline-ethanol 
mixture ratio (90%-10%) to qualify for state and federal subsidies; and 
reluctance on the part of refiners to substitute ethanol for 10 per cent of their 
petroleum products. Consequently, ethanol has been used and priced chiefly 
as a gasoline substitute, primarily in mid-west markets. With this limited 
market scope and a small regional industry there has been little demand for 
policy correction. 
Now, all this is changing. The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendment 
followed by a 1991 industry-government accord to produce gasolines with 
higher oxygen content has created a second, but greatly expanded and higher 
value market opportunity for fuel ethanol; especially in specific pollution non-
attainment markets. Some states and cities are enacting fuel regulations that 
go beyond those specified in the Clean Air Act, adding further to the need for 
alternative fuels such as ethanol. Estimates place this new oxygenate additive 
demand at 3.7 billion gallons of ethanol equivalent by 1995; more than three 
times current ethanol use. 
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The clean air benefits of ethanol additives in gasoline are substantial 
and ethanol can compete effectively for a significant part of this new market. 
However, the ability of the U.S. com based industry to supply efficiently the 
needed quantities of competitively priced ethanol continues to be limited. 
Yet, a major com ethanol expansion effort is under way, protected by high 
subsidies and import taxes. And, budget costs mount. 
To limit tax payer and consumer costs and to assure long run market 
acceptance, ethanol supplies from the much more efficient sugar cane based 
ethanol industries in Latin America (principally Brazil) need to be included 
in the policy framework. This may be politically difficult since corn producers 
have provided strong support for current policy including the ban on imports. 
But, even this support may be short sighted, since the potential benefits from 
counter trade in ethanol and corn far exceed the benefits to U.S. com farmers 
from domestic use of corn to produce ethanol. 
These new market realities signal the need to replace the infant 
industry, producer oriented policy arguments that prevailed in the 1980s with 
a more mature view of the costs and opportunities that ethanol production, 
trade, and use bring to the U.S. economy. Consumers (taxpayers) will clearly 
gain from a trade oriented ethanol policy while U.S. ethanol producers will 
lose. But, a modest, restructured subsidy program targeted to domestic 
producers would protect investments already made while allowing significant 
benefits of trade to be achieved in the new clean-air era. 
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Ethanol Production Capacity 
Ethanol production capacity from corn is currently about 1.1 billion 
gallons per year, less than one percent of gasoline use (115 billion gallons). 
This capacity utilizes about 450 million bushels of corn annually. One bushel 
of com produces 2.5 gallons of ethanol and 18 lbs. of distillers dried grains 
under a dry-milling process. Wet milling produces a different set of by-
products: 1.6 lbs. of corn oil, 2.5 lbs. of com gluten meal, 12.5 lbs. of corn 
gluten feed and 15-18 lbs. of carbon dioxide. 
These ethanol by-products compete with soybean products in protein 
feed and oil markets, lessening the impact of additional corn demand on 
farmer income. For example, adding one billion gallons of ethanol capacity 
would require an additional 400 million bushels of com, but would raise the 
price of corn only $0.10 per bushel (USDA). 
Brazil produces 3 billion gallons of ethanol per year from sugar cane, 
but has capacity to produce over 4 billion gallons and therefore could be an 
additional supply source for the U.S market. Since sugar cane requires two 
years to mature, this excess Brazilian capacity would not be available to world 
markets for at least two years. A minor sugar cane based ethanol industry is 
also possible in the Caribbean. 
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Ethanol Production Costs 
During the 1980s, costs of producing ethanol from com ranged from 
$.90 to $1.50 per gallon depending on com prices, ethanol by-product prices, 
and energy costs (USDA). At today's com price of about $2.50 per bushel, 
average ethanol costs are $1.30 per gallon. Com at $3.00 per bushel would 
raise this cost to about $1.50 per gallon. Corn at $1.50 per bushel would 
lower the cost to $1.00 per gallon. 
Brazilian sugar cane based ethanol can be produced for $.80 per gallon 
and delivered to U.S. gasoline refineries for $1.00-1.10 per gallon, but a $.54 
import tax and $.03 import duty bring the total U.S. market cost to about 
$1.60 per gallon. 
Ethanol Subsidies 
The federal subsidy is $.54 per gallon of ethanol. State subsidies, on 
average, add another $.10 for a total subsidy of about $.65 per gallon. The 
federal subsidy is generally applied at the blending or retail level in the form 
of a $.054 exemption from the federal excise tax on each gallon of ethanol-
gasoline mixture sold (10% ethanol, 90% gasoline). Recently, ETBE (ethanol 
and isobutylene) production has been cleared for an equivalent subsidy at the 
refinery level. ETBE will compete with MTBE as an octane enhancer and as 
an oxygenate source. 
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State subsidies vary in amount and form and are concentrated in com 
producing states. In Ohio, the state tax exemption is applied at the wholesale 
level directly to ethanol sales and is currently $.15 per gallon of ethanol. 
Thus, in Ohio, the net cost of ethanol to a gas station would be $.69 less than 
the market price of ethanol. For example, if ethanol sold for $1.30 per gallon, 
the net cost to the gas station would be $.61 per gallon ($1.30-$.69=$,61). 
State subsidies are gradually declining as states realize that local producers 
cannot capture the subsidy rents and state budgets come under increasing 
pressure. 
A $.57 per gallon import tax-duty ($.54 tax, $.03 duty) effectively 
shields U.S. ethanol producers from foreign competition. The import tax 
offsets the federal excise tax exemption. With a cost of $1.10 per gallon of 
imported ethanol, the net cost of imported ethanol to Ohio gas stations would 
be $.98 per gallon as compared to the $.61 per gallon for domestic ethanol 
($1.10+ $.57-$.69=$.98). 
Because of the current policy focus, 96 percent of ethanol production 
capacity and 70 percent of ethanol demand (1991) is located in ten midwest-
em states (corn belt and adjacent states). More specifically, 80 percent of 
ethanol production capacity is located in a small area surrounding Chicago in 
Northern Illinois, Eastern Iowa and Northwestern Indiana (figure 1). 
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Ethanol and the Clean Air Act 
The Clean Air Act Amendment of 1990 changes dramatically the 
market and policy focus of ethanol production and use. The original Clean 
Air Act {1970) was focused on the automobile as a polluting agent. In the 
1990 amendment, fuel is the primary focus. Over the next several years, a 
number of new fuels will replace traditional gasoline in over one-half of the 
gasoline markets. The first change is to an oxygen requirement (2.7%) in 
gasoline sold in about 40 metropolitan areas in the winter months starting in 
November of 1992. The oxygen is needed to reduce carbon monoxide (CO) 
emissions. This creates an immediate new oxygenate additive market demand 
equivalent to 1.3 billion gallons of ethanol. 
A mixture of eight percent ethanol and 92 percent gasoline satisfies 
this new requirement. MTBE will also meet the oxygen requirement, but at 
double the ethanol concentration. Combinations of the two additives can be 
used, gaining their octane properties as well. This changes significantly the 
economics of gasoline refining. It also changes the reference price for ethanol 
from wholesale gasoline ( + /- $0.65/gallon) to MTBE ( + /- $1.00/gallon). 
This new demand for oxygenated fuels will be generated primarily in 
major metropolitan areas, located principally on or near the East (35%) and 
West (39%) coasts; areas most easily supplied by water transport. For 
example, California will require one-third of the oxygenated fuel mandated 
for CO non-attainment areas; the eastern coastal corridor from Boston to 
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Washington D.C. will require a second third. This adds a $.12 to $.27 per 
gallon transportation cost to bring mid-west com based ethanol to these 
coastal markets. ii 
The second new fuel is a reformulated gasoline that will be required t 
to combat ozone (smog) formation. Again, this fuel will have an oxygen 
component (2% ), and will be mandated in nine metropolitan areas for the full 
year starting in 1995. As with the CO non-attainment areas, 74% of the 
demand will be located on the east and west coasts. Oxygenate additive 
demand for reformulated fuel will be equivalent to 2.4 billion gallons of 
ethanol. The impact of ethanol use on ozone formation is less clearly known. 
Thus, its role as a component in reformulated gasoline is still to be deter-
mined. By the turn of the century, even more stringent fuel specification will 
bring additional changes to automotive fuel markets. 
Counter Trade Possibilities 
As noted above, Brazil has a cost advantage in producing and 
marketing ethanol. They also have a current one billion gallon annual excess 
production capacity and the land available to make considerable sugar cane 
production expansion if international ethanol markets are available. 
Brazil is also the world's third largest producer of corn. But, com 
production in Brazil is competitive only in interior production regions. U.S. 
com can be delivered to deficit coastal regions of Brazil at lower costs than 
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Brazil can produce and transport corn from interior producing regions. This 
creates a comparative advantage relationship - corn from the U.S. and ethanol 
from Brazil - that can form the basis for bi-lateral trade. Similar trade 
potential exists in the Caribbean and other Latin American countries. For 
farmers, trade markets are preferable to ethanol producer markets since they 
avoid the price depressing effects of ethanol by-product competition with 
soybeans. 
A Suggested Policy Reform 
The current federal policy (as noted above), involves an exemption 
from federal excise taxes at the blender and retail levels for specific ethanol 
uses, (a 10% ethanol - 90% gasoline mixture, and ETBE) with an offsetting 
import tax-duty. The net result of this narrowly focused policy is a limited 
ethanol supply, a high priced product that has narrowly defined uses only, and 
an ethanol industry with periodic booms and busts as it operates on a fixed 
subsidy level, but faces volatile prices for corn (cost side) and oil (revenue 
side). 
As we contemplate ethanol policy in the Clean Air-Free Trade Era 
(and assuming that we wish to maintain a minimum domestic ethanol 
program), a far better alternative would be a variable ethanol subsidy paid 
directly to producers. This would eliminate the current high market price for 
ethanol and the need for an import tax. The variable subsidy would be 
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determined periodically (monthly or quarterly), and w~uld take into account 
average industry production costs and current corn and fuel (additive) prices, 
eliminating the economic uncertainty associated with wide swings in com and 
.. 
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fuel prices. It would also minimize treasury costs. 
With a subsidy paid directly to U.S. ethanol producers, ethanol prices 
would find their own competitive level in the market, as ethanol is drawn 
automatically to it's best use. Refiners, gasoline marketers and other ethanol 
users, would be free to adjust to the most economic use. Imports would 
compete on a non-subsidized level, and add to and diversify our fuel sources. 
Many important public interests (clean air, diversified energy supplies, 
consumer and taxpayer costs) have been lost in previous policy debates over 
the private interests of corn farmers, ethanol producers, and automobile and 
oil companies. The economics are clear. If ethanol, is produced, traded, and 
used in relatively free markets, it can play a major role in the clean-air era. 
We need to refocus public discussion on the important policy issues. 
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Figure 1. 
The Changing U.S. Ethanol Supply-Demand Structure 
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